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Abstract
In Germany, hard coal has been subsidized for almost half a century. Despite
the declining significance of hard coal production for the domestic labor
market, the magnitude of subsidies increased until the middle of the last
decade. In 1996, they peaked at ¤ 6.7 bill. While German hard coal subsidies
have been shrinking to ¤ 2.7 bill. in 2005, it is very likely that they will be ex-
tended well into the next decade and even beyond. This article discusses the
feeble arguments raised by the proponents of hard coal subsidization in
Germany and other EU countries. Most importantly, in addition to the drain
imposed on public budgets, these subsidies imply a substantial opportunity
cost,leading funds away from alternative,more beneficial public investments.
From a social welfare perspective, we therefore recommend the rapid abo-
lition of these subsidies not only in Germany,where in nominal terms the ac-
cumulated amount of subsidies has now by far exceeded ¤ 130 bill., but all
across Europe.
JEL-Classification:Q28,Q42,Q58.
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Since the coal crisis of 1958, Germany has been subsidizing the hard coal
mining sector,spending some ¤ 128 bill.between 1958 and 2002 (Storchmann
2005). Arguably, there is no other German producer subsidy that has been
grantedforsomanyyearsatsuchahighlevel.Eventoday,hardcoalsupportis
still the largest single subsidy paid by the German federal government (BMF
2006). The European Commission authorized Germany to grant ¤ 2.7 bill.
hard coal subsidies in 2005 (EC 2006a), cementing Germany’s role as by far
the largest supporter of hard coal production among all OECD countries
(Storchmann 2005:1469).
Although hard coal subsidization has been criticized for decades by virtually
all respectable German economists (e.g.SVR 1983),the subsidies paid in 2005
were at about the same level as in the first half of the 1980s (Figure 1), when
hard coal production was substantially higher. This pattern reflects the
widening gap between domestic production cost and world market price
(Figure 2). The amount of subsidies rose particularly dramatically between
1986 and 1996. Only since 1996, when a peak at about ¤ 6.7 bill. had been
reached,German hard coal subsidies have been shrinking.
The persistency of hard coal subsidization in European countries such as
Spain, Poland, and particularly Germany, nicely matches standard political
economy considerations (Anderson 1995: 492)1. This approach to explaining
political decisions argues that it is in the interest of governments to deliver
large benefits to well-organized groups, while costs are typically imposed on
less organized groups such as taxpayers in a dispersed way.
Since the publication of a special issue of Energy Policy on the implications of
dismantled hard coal subsidies (Radetzki 1995a), only a few international
studies have addressed the topic, such as Storchmann (2005) and Welsch
(1998),despite the fact that Anderson’s (1995: 495) mild hope that Belgium’s
dismantling of subsidies in the early 1990s would spread to the remaining pro-
tectionist countries has not come true. Meanwhile, the situation on the
demand side has changed significantly, in particular in the European power
generation sectors,and the time has come to re-examine the case for a prolon-
gation of hard coal subsidization. Its proponents relentlessly advocate ex-
tended subsidies, referring to energy supply security and employment effects
as their major arguments.
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1 Anderson(1995:492)summarizestheempiricalevidencethatanindustryislikelytobeassisted
more intensively the more it is a low-wage, low-value-added, declining industry involving few
firms and facing strong and growing import competition. Political support can typically be re-
cruited even more successfully, if the industry is geographically concentrated, e.g. being a major
employer in a region and involving only a small number of towns. Anderson conludes that it is
thusnotsurprisingthatWesternEurope’scoalminingindustryhasenjoyedincreasingassistance.Against this backdrop, the current article discusses the pros and cons of hard
coal subsidization,mainly concentrating on the example of Germany.From a
social welfare perspective, none of the arguments raised in favor of further
subsidization is convincing. In line with the International Energy Agency
(IEA 2002:72),we therefore recommend the rapid abolition of this most sig-
nificant single subsidy in Germany, where it currently seems likely that sub-
sidies will be extended well into the next decade and even beyond – despite
the fact that domestic production costs are dramatically higher than the price
of imported hard coal (Figure 2) and that it is very unlikely that the German
coal industry would become competitive even if world market prices were to
rise due to an increase of global demand for coal (Heilemann, Hillebrand
1992: 154).
Our analysis commences with a description of the hard coal market in OECD
Europe and its competitiveness with the international hard coal market
(Section 2). Section 3 is devoted to the frequently employed argument of
energy supply security.In Sections 4 and 5,we balance the economic and envi-
ronmental costs and benefits of subsidies for domestic hard coal production.
Section 6 examines the social consequences of discontinuing coal production.
In the last section,we draw our conclusions.
2. Hard Coal Production in Europe
In 2005, hard coal was produced in ten European OECD countries, with five
countries being only of minor importance2. With a production of almost
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Sources:Storchmann 2005;BMF,several years.
2 BelgiumandFranceproducedmerelysmallamountsfromrecoveredslurries,whiletheproduc-
tion of Norway,Turkey,and Italy is usually between 0.1 and 3 mill.t (IEA 2006:I.5).26 mill. t in 2005 (Coal Statistics 2006), Germany was the second largest pro-
ducing country,being only topped by Poland,whose production amounted to
about 100 mill. t (IEA 2006: I.5). While some of these OECD countries, most
notably Germany, spend huge amounts of money on hard coal subsidization,
other countries, above all the United Kingdom and Czech Republik, operate
without significant government support (IEA 2006: I.5). The reason is that,
unlike the situation in Germany, production costs are close to the world
market price,particularly in the UK (IEA 2003: I.208).In fact,the UK records
by far the lowest and declining cost levels over time (Radetzki 1995b:517).
The importance of hard coal has steadily declined in Europe over the past
decades. In Germany, for instance, demand for hard coal fell from about
106 mill. t in 1973 (IEA 2003: I.107) to just below 68 mill. t in 2004 (IEA
2006: II.166). Almost exclusively, this decrease in demand was driven by the
decline in coking coal (IEA 2006: II.166) – a high-quality coal grade needed
for producing the coke that is essential for steel production. In the UK, the
decline in hard coal consumption was even more pronounced than in
Germany. In 2004, the UK’s consumption of hard coal was only about half of
the 120 mill. t used in 1978,primarily caused by the decline in steam coal con-
sumption of electricity producers (IEA 2006: II.232). In OECD Europe as a
whole,hard coal consumption shrank some 25% to roughly 382 mill.t in 2004
(IEA 2006: III.59).
Even stronger than the decrease in consumption was the decline in pro-
duction:Between 1978 and 2004,total hard coal production in OECD Europe
fell by some 60%,from 483 to about 187 mill.t (IEA 2006: II.56).As as result,
theimportshareoftheseOECDcountrieshasincreasedfrom5%to51%.The
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Widening Gap between Prices for German and Imported Steam Coal
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Source:VdKI 2005:78.most important reason for this much stronger dependency on imports is the
lacking competitiveness of European hard coal production. In Germany, for
example,the cost of domestic coal production has been more than three times
the import price of steam coal for decades (Figure 2; Radetzki 1995b: 517).
This cost discrepancy is due to the fact that virtually all the coal produced in
countries such as Colombia,Indonesia,and Venezuela comes from large-scale
low-cost open-cast mining operations, rather than pit mines as in Europe.
Open-castminesalsoaccountforsome80%ofAustraliancoalandabout60%
of the coal produced in the USA.This is why these countries are able to reach
a productivity of up to 16,000 tonnes per employee per year (Schiffer, Kopal
2005: 173).In Europe,where mining conditions are generally much more dif-
ficult, productivity only reaches about 5% of this figure. The considerably
lower cost makes overseas coal much more attractive to customers than coal
from Europe,and especially from Germany.
3. Energy Policy: Security of Supply
Security of supply is among the most cited arguments raised against the abo-
litionofhardcoalsubsidiesinEUcountriessuchasSpainandGermany(IEA
2002: 70). Yet, when the issue of supply security is emphasized by those de-
fending continued subsidization,they typically ignore that the situation in the
European power generation sectors – responsible for as much as 81% of hard
coal use in OECD Europe in 2004 (IEA 2006: II.59) – has significantly
changed since their liberalization,which was initiated by the EU in 1998.As a
consequence of liberalization, ascertaining secure energy and raw material
supplies has now become the responsibility of the private industry,rather than
thatofthenationalgovernments.Thisshiftinresponsibilityisinperfectaccord
with the governments’ diminished influence on the power generation sectors.
To an even greater extent than in the past, it is thus the private interest of
power generators to use long-term contracts and other measures to avoid any
supply scarcities;otherwise,their profit would shrink.
The situation in power generation is now similar to that in other sectors of in-
dustry, such as the copper and aluminum production, where it is the sole re-
sponsibility of the firms to secure their production inputs. In the chemical in-
dustry,forexample,companieshavealwaysbeenresponsibleforobtainingad-
equate quantities of naphtha, one of their main raw materials. Meanwhile, it
has also become normal practice for power generators to bear the price and
quantity risks pertaining to the procurement of their major inputs, such as
natural gas and coal. German power generators, for instance, increasingly
purchaseimportedhardcoalfromavarietyofcountries,mainlyfromtheNon-
OECD countries Colombia,South Africa,and Russia,as well as from OECD
countries such as Australia,Poland,and the U.S.(IEA 2006: II.168).
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organized stockpiling of imported coal.Thus,security of supply can clearly be
ensured much more efficiently than by cost-intensive subsidies for domes-
tically produced coal. Most importantly, over the long term, there has been a
significant improvement in the supply situation, as global trade in hard coal
has been growing substantially in recent decades. Since 1990, the seaborne
tradeinhardcoalhasdoubled;theincreasesince1975hasbeenalmostsixfold.
The total amount of globally traded coal, including coal carried by land, has
quadrupled between 1975 and 2005 (Schiffer,Kopal 2005:172;VdKI 2006:2).
Over the past 15 years, traditional coal exporters such as Australia, Canada,
Poland, and the U.S. have been joined by many other countries, most notably
China, Russia, Colombia, Indonesia, and Venezuela (Schiffer, Kopal 2005:
173).
Theincreaseinhardcoaltradinghasevenacceleratedbetween2003and2005:
world trading surged by about 20%, i.e. by 134, to 804 mill. t (VdKI 2006: 2).
Thatis,withinonlytwoyears,worldmarketgrowthmighthaveeasilyreplaced
Poland’s current hard coal production of roughly 100 mill. t. Compared with
these volumes, the quantities of coal produced in Germany and Spain were
virtually insignificant. At about 26 mill. t in 2005, German hard coal pro-
duction only corresponded to about 3% of the total quantity traded globally,
while Spain’s production of about 8 mill. t is even less significant (IEA
2006: I.34). Given the strong capacity expansion in several countries, partic-
ularly in Indonesia and Russia, world production capacity and, hence, global
tradecanwellbeexpectedtogrowconsiderablyinthefuture(Kopal2006:72).
8 Manuel Frondel, Rainer Kambeck, and Christoph M. Schmidt
World Hard Coal Trade
1980 to 2005; Mill. t
1000 1000
800 800
200 200
400 400
600 600
0 0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
World seaborne coking coal trade
Total world coal trade
World seaborne steam coal trade
Figure 3
Sources:IEA Statistics 2004,2006;VdKI 2006.Some observers currently raise particular concerns about the shrinking
exports of China, the world’s largest hard coal producer, whose production
share was higher than 40% in 2004 (IEA 2006: I.4).Since 2003,China’s steam
coal exports sank by 18%, from about 80 to approximately 66 mill. t in 2005
(IEA2006:III.19).Chinesecokingcoalexportswereevenmorereduced,from
slightly more than 15 to 6 mill.t (IEA 2006: III.18),a decrease of 61%.Yet,as
Figure 3 demonstates,higher levels of exports by Australia,Colombia,Russia,
Indonesia,andtheU.S.havebeenmorethansufficienttooffsettheshortfallin
Chinese exports in recent years (VdKI 2006:55).After all,reduced exports of
China had hardly any impact on Europe’s import volumes3, but on world
market and import prices.Yet,the volatility of import prices for steam coal is
significantly less pronounced than for other fuels such as oil or natural gas
(IEA 2006: I.18;Figure 4).
In sum, while raw material markets are well-known for cyclical fluctuations
(Kopal 2006: 72), electricity generators, as well as steel producers, can avoid
short-term bottlenecks by stockpiling imported coal,which is a much more ef-
ficient way of achieving supply security than by subsidizing the domestic pro-
duction of hard coal, while a growing world market offers a reasonable
long-term supply security (IEA 2002: 70). The International Energy Agency
therefore concludes that ensuring energy supply security is not a strong basis
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Sources:IEA 2005,2006.
3 OECDcountriesinEuropehavenotbeenaffectedbythisdramaticdrop,astheyusuallydonot
import Chinese coking coal (IEA 2006: III.18).Similarly,steam coal imports from China have al-
ways been heavily fluctuating around low levels of several hundred thousand tonnes in Germany,
France,Spain,and the UK,once again reaching only very low levels in 2005 (IEA 2006: III.19).for continuing German hard coal production,since the risk of a persistent in-
terruption of supplies can be regarded as minimal (IEA 2002:71).
4. Economic Effects of Subsidized Hard Coal Mining
Any analysis of the economic effects of hard coal subsidies must depart from
recognizingthatthereisnogenuinedemandforGermanhardcoal.Thereason
isthatdomesticpowergeneratorsaswellassteelproducerscanpurchasehard
coal on the fast-growing world market,while today hardly any coal is used for
heating by private consumers. Therefore, any decision to reduce or even dis-
continue hard coal production would have virtually no effect on the activities
of German power and steel companies and their demand for labor.Subsidies
for the coal industry therefore simply degenerate to a program of job pro-
visioninthepublicsector,bearingallthenegativeconsequencesofthistypeof
active labor market policy (Schmidt et al. 2001; Jacobi, Kluve 2006; Kluve
2006).
Foracomprehensiveassessmentofsubsidies,onehastotakefinancingaspects
into account.After all,the use of public funds requires that they are collected
from the taxpayer first.Yet,the question of financing is frequently neglected.
This is all the more important, since subsidies are often a significant con-
tributor to an increase in public debts. Germany seems to be an outstanding
example,where an accelerated reduction of hard coal subsidies would help to
mitigate current severe public deficits. Public debts of the federal state
reached a level of about ¤ 888 bill.by 2005 (BWpV 2006).The contribution of
hard coal subsidies to the increase in public debts since 1990 amounts to
almost ¤ 74 bill. Reducing public deficits thus appears to be a particularly
promising alternative to hard coal subsidization in Germany.
In this context, a superficially plausible argument frequently put forward in
support of subsidies is that the increased income and consumption tax
revenues,which are the consequences of the impetus evoked by the subsidies,
in turn lower the government’s net support4. However, a comprehensive
account of public resource flows would also include a variety of services
provided by the government to the mining industry, such as the maintenance
of infrastructure, to the extent that they benefit the subsidized sector. Not
counting these services, but including the tax revenues would thus be dis-
torting the record. If these services were contrasted with the additional tax
revenues, though, the result would likely tilt even more against the German
coal mining industry, as these subsidies were granted to compensate for its
poor economic performance,not as a premium for its achievements.
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4 This kind of argument is also employed in favor of the support of other commodities such as
biofuels, for instance, which are not competitive to conventional fuels and thus are supported in
manyEUcountriesbyreductionsandexemptionsfrommineraloiltaxes(Frondel,Peters2006).Another typical justification of public subsidies is that they tend to induce
so-called Leontief multiplier effects. In addition to the immediate impact on
thesubsidizedsector,sotheargumentgoes,thereisalsoanindirectimpetusin
sectors with close economic ties to the subsidized industry (Raa 2005).Based
on the interconnections between different sectors of industry, which are typ-
ically captured by input-output analyses, such Leontief multiplier effects
reflect the fact that upstream sectors usually provide significant input to the
added value generated by the subsidized sector, whose output, on the other
side, triggers added value in downstream sectors. After all, however, (gross)
multiplier effects are even created in the classical example of wasting public
funds, the tearing up of a perfectly intact road in order to rebuild and pave it
again.This type of project would also call for inputs of up-stream sectors and
employs workers who use their wages to buy food and other goods and
services,butitiseasytoagreethattherecouldnotbeanygenuineaddedvalue.
Furthermore,itwouldbemorethannaïvetoreportanysuchmultipliereffects
withoutraisingthequestionofopportunitycosts.Specifically,oneneedstoask
what alternative multiplier effects are not realized, because the public funds
are allocated to the subsidized sector and not to some other use. If the
counterfactualalternatives–contrastingwhatlevelofeconomicactivitywedo
observe and what we would have seen, had the government spent the tax-
payers’moneymorewisely–commandhighermultipliereffects,theneteffect
ofthesubsidyisnegative.Clearly,itisalwayseasiertodefendastatusquothan
to make the case for a counterfactual alternative situation,with lower or even
without any subsidized hard coal production.
Yet, not explicitly constructing an assessment of the counterfactual situation,
whereitisalwaysnecessarytoinvokeassumptionsaboutthemarketresultsin
alternative circumstances5, for instance about the miners’ alternative em-
ployment prospects, does not mean avoiding the question altogether: When
the proponents of hard coal subsidies present multiplier effects as their as-
sessment of the economic effects of hard coal subsidization, they implicitly
assume that all economic agents involved automatically ceased any activity
when subsidies were removed from the system.This is certainly the least con-
vincing counterfactual one can think of. To the extent that economic activity
was to emerge without hard coal subsidies, the public subsidies would crowd
out private action,and public funds would simply be wasted.
Given that the large-scale reduction of government interventions into the
marketeconomyisnotaviablepoliticalalternative,themostimportantaspect
in the discussion of the hard coal subsidies’ net effects is the crowding-out of
possiblealternatives:Thesubsidiescurrentlygrantedtothehardcoalindustry
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5 For an extensive discussion of the fundamental evaluation problem and potential evaluation
approaches in environmental contexts,see Frondel,Schmidt 2005.might be used in other sectors, potentially creating substantial value added
thereandthereforeimprovingsocialwelfare.Thiscrowding-outofalternative
investments is often ignored when the economic impact of subsidies is
evaluated.Investments in traffic infrastructure,education,as well as research
and development regarding future energy technologies, particularly im-
proving the efficiency of coal-fired power stations and the removal of carbon
dioxide from power station flue gases,can be certainly expected to yield much
higher (gross) benefits than hard coal subsidies. Given the large reserves of
lignite, such technologies are of crucial importance for the power generation
industry in the future and for the reduction of Germany’s greenhouse gas
emissions.
More generally, only those alternative investments that unleash the creative
and economic potential of a country may substantially enhance future
economicperformanceandincreasefutureemploymentprospectsand,hence,
create genuine value added. Investments and subsidies that are not found to
meet this objective,however,should be abolished as soon as possible.For this
reason, as a general principle, subsidies are to be granted only for a limited
time. In case of the German hard coal industry, however, there are no
prospects whatsoever that it could become profitable within a foreseeable
period of time.On the one hand,these subsidies merely ensure the continued
existence of this industry,thereby reinforcing obsolete structures.In addition,
they impede structural change of companies in upstream sectors by reducing
their incentives to develop to the point where survival is possible under
marketconditions.Ontheotherhand,thecontinuedsupportforcoalsubsidies
significantly weakens the chances for supporting promising, future-oriented
projects, as governments commonly do not have unlimited funds at their
disposal.
An often repeated argument in this context is that subsidies and the contin-
uation of German mining operations are essential in order to ensure export
prospects for leading-edge mining technology from Germany. The questions
we ought to be asking,though,are,first,why such a successful,but highly spe-
cialized,activity is not subsidized directly and only for a limited period of time
and,second,whycompaniescannotfindopportunitiestotesttheirtechnology
in the mines of potential customers located in other countries. In addition, it
seems to be very unlikely that all these companies and employees would fall
idle if subsidies for the German coal industry were discontinued.
In sum,when the public sector hands out funds,they can be spent more or less
wisely.If they are spent in a way that enhances future economic potential sub-
stantially,chancesarehighthatnetsocialwelfareisimprovedbythewholeop-
eration. In the case of a large-scale job provision program, though, that
supports the continued production of a good, such as domestic hard coal, for
whichnogenuinedemandexists,anyhopeforpositiveneteffectsseemshighly
12 Manuel Frondel, Rainer Kambeck, and Christoph M. Schmidtquestionable. In the next section, we argue that the continuation of the hard
coal subsidy policy results in significant environmental damages. Thus, even
the subsidies’ gross effects,not only the net effects,are likely to be negative.
5. Environmental Consequences of Hard Coal Production
If hard coal production was to be entirely halted today,it would be possible to
avoid large quantities of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly methane,
which is about 21 times more harmful than carbon dioxide (CO2) in warming
the planet.Methane is relased from coal seams that are exposed to air,as fre-
quently happens during mining.It is a hazard in underground mines and must
be vented in order to prevent explosions. Methane emission rates from hard
coal mines in Europe are generally 50% to 100% greater than those in the
major exporting countries (Steenblik,Coronyannakis 1995:547).Hence,sub-
stituting imported coal for European hard coal upon closing down mines
could not only make a considerable contribution to meeting the European
climate targets of the Kyoto Protocol, but would indeed reduce overall
greenhouse gas output in the world.
The CO2 emissions of the German hard coal mining sector, for instance,
amountedto2.7mill.tin2002.Withinthebunchofvoluntarycommitmentsto
climate protection offered by the German industries,it is the declared aim of
this industry to reduce its annual CO2 emissions to 2.3 mill. t by 2012 (RWI
Essen 2006: 211). Hence, if production were to be discontinued in 2012, it
wouldbepossibletoavoidmorethan2mill.tofCO2emissionsperyear,notto
mention the methane emissions that may also be saved: Abstaining from the
foreseen production of 16 mill. t in 2012 would allow for avoiding roughly
250,000 t of methane per year, given the methane emissions rate of 15,230
tonnes per mill. t coal provided by Steenblik and Coronyannakis (1995: 548).
Based on the global warming factor of 21, this would mean an additional
annual greenhouse gas reduction of more than 5 mill. t CO2 equivalents. In
other words, abandoning German hard coal production would yield much
larger greenhouse gas emission reductions than is required by the first
German national allocation plan and almost half of the requirements set by
thesecondplan.TheseplansdemandanannualCO2emissionreductiontarget
of 2 mill. t in the period 2005 to 2007 for those industries involved in the
emissions trading system and of 15 mill. t in the period 2008 to 2012 (EID
2006: 19).
Moreover, as a result of the artificial extension of hard coal mining in
Germany,attention is increasingly focusing on other environmental damages,
such as the potential contamination of aquifers, and substantial damages of
private buildings due to earthquakes originating from mining. There is an-
ecdotal evidence that some of those areas affected by current or former
Hard Coal Subsidies: A Never-Ending Story? 13mining suffer from more than one hundred earthquakes a year. The conse-
quence of these damages, inducing instability and potential destruction of
private houses,is confirmed by the large number of people who are organized
in initiatives because they are directly and strongly affected by coal mining.If
coal mining continues,these damages will become even more pronounced.
Insum,thecontinuationofsubsidiesforhardcoalminingisthereforenotonly
dispensable with respect to ascertaining energy security, and not only highly
questionable as an instrument to provide economic stimulus, it is even
harmful. Hard coal mining causes significant environmental and individual
damages, be it partial or complete destruction of houses or be it losses in the
value of buildings and properties,and,hence,even the subsidies’ gross effects
are likely to be negative when these damages were to be included in the quan-
titative assessments.
6. Social Consequences of Dismantling Hard Coal Production
Basedonthestatusquo,afinalmajorargumentoftenusedagainstdismantling
subsidies for the German hard coal industry is that the people employed in
that industry would most likely become unemployed without exception. As
those employed in the mining industry are said to be very well trained, their
prospects on the labor market ought to be comparatively bright, however. In
fact,unemployment in Germany is largely a problem associated with a lack of
training and marketable skills (e.g.Schmidt et al.2001).Thus,it appears to be
unlikely that all employees occupied by the hard coal mining industry would
remainunemployedforalongtimeaftertheclosureofthelastofthecurrently
8 operating mines.
In addition,it is difficult to imagine that the integration of the present mining
workforce into the unsubsidized labor market would pose such a severe
challenge,whentheirnumberiscomparedwiththeredundanciesthathaveoc-
curred in the past (Figure 5).By the end of 2005,the number of employees di-
rectly involved in the German hard coal mining industry was about 38 500
(Coal Statistics 2006). Compared to the mining workforce in the 1960s and
1970s, when several hundred thousands of employees belonged to this in-
dustry,this figure is relatively small.In fact,reducing the industry’s workforce
by a similar number of employees was achieved in those decades within a
couple of years. Relative to the total number of unemployed people in
Germany, averaging more than 4.8 mill. in 2005 (Destatis 2006), this figure is
also rather negligible. Furthermore, in the worst case scenario that all of the
38 500 employees were to become unemployed, the unemployment rate of
11.6% in 2005 would have risen by 0.09 percentage points.
To specifically mitigate social disruptions,it would be more efficient if the em-
ployeesofthehardcoalminingsectorweresupporteddirectly(IEA2002:72),
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with incentives to quickly switch to a new job.Payments could also ensure ad-
ditional training for people with problems on the labor market.The funds re-
quired for this purpose would only be a fraction of the cost of continued coal
subsidies, since subsidies, when expressed on a per mine employee basis, are
several times the average wage per miner (Anderson 1995: 485, 495). Finally,
domestic hard coal production would not cease suddenly,from one day to the
next, but would last at least until 2008, currently the last year for which sub-
sidies are already legally guaranteed. Thus, both the employees affected as
well as the related up-stream sectors would have sufficient time to search for
alternative employment.
7. Summary and Conclusions
Yearafteryear,bill.sofeurosarespentforhardcoalsubsidiesinEurope,most
notably in Germany, where these subsidies currently amount to about ¤
2.6 bill. (EC 2006b). While hard coal is still produced in several OECD
countries in Europe, for instance in Spain, Great Britain, and France, it was
Germany that granted by far the highest subsidy per tonne of coal among
these countries in the last decade of the twentieth century (IEA 2002: 68).
Without these subsidies, hard coal production in Europe would not be com-
petitive due to geological disadvantages. Although production damages
buildings and contributes to a range of environmental problems,most notably
via the emission of greenhouse gases,and directs scarce resources from more
competitive, forward-looking sectors of the economy to obsolete structures,
thereby exacerbating public deficits,the German government is miraculously
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Source:Coal Statistics 2006.considering to continue subsidizing domestic hard coal production for more
than another decade,implying that new coal fields have to be opened and ad-
ditional permanent cost are induced due to the necessity to pump down
ground water.
This article has identified a number of key arguments that are repeatedly put
forwardinfavorofhardcoalsubsidies.Thesearguments,whicharefrequently
employed for the subsidization of other commodities such as biofuels as well,
areanythingbutwell-founded.Asageneralrule,almostallofthesearguments
nurture economic fears and anxieties held by the general public.
The first line of arguments rests on the security of energy supply, raising
concerns about a growing dependence on imports of increasingly scarce raw
materials. Of course, at times when energy and raw material prices are high,
energy security arguments find particularly high acceptance. While raw ma-
terialmarketsarewell-knownforcyclicaldevelopmentswithalternatinghigh-
and low-price phases,one has to recognize that the situation in the European
power generation sectors – responsible for as much as 81% of hard coal use in
OECD Europe in 2004 (IEA 2006: II.59) – has significantly changed since the
liberalization of European power markets initiated by the EU in 1998. As a
consequence, the security of energy supplies has now become the responsi-
bility of the private power industry, rather than national governments. To
avoid short-term bottlenecks,electricity generators,as well as steel producers,
can store imported coal, ensuring a much more efficient supply security than
by subsidizing hard coal, while a growing world market offers a reasonable
long-term supply security (IEA 2002:70).
A second line of arguments refers to the cost and benefits of subsidies. It is
generally argued that subsidies initiate multiplier effects,conserving not only
jobs in the subsidized sector but also creating substantial employment effects
and value added in up- and downstream sectors. Furthermore, it is a popular
generalargumentofproponentsandrecipientsofsubsidiesthatthedirectand
indirect impetus evoked by subsidies lower the government’s net support due
to additional income and consumption tax revenues originating from the sub-
sidized as well as related sectors.
Yet, we have highlighted the importance of considering counterfactual situ-
ations,ratherthanonlythestatusquo,andarguethat,ifhardcoalfunds,which
represent the largest individual subsidy in Germany,were to be discontinued,
there would be significant additional scope for future-oriented policies. The
tremendous amount of more than ¤ 130 bill.that has been employed for hard
coal funds over the past fifty years could have been used to a much greater
benefit elsewhere, for example for education as well as research and devel-
opment of future energy technologies. Indeed, such expenditures of public
funds would have likely generated much larger multiplier effects than those
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ronment if hard coal production was to be abolished as soon as possible
(Heilemann, Hillebrand 1992: 155). Above all, greenhouse gas emissions
might be reduced by more than 7 mill.t of CO2 equivalents per year – almost
half of the German burden set for the second period of the EU emissions
trading system (2008–2012).
The third line of arguments stokes anxieties about a further growth in unem-
ployment,asmassredundanciesarethreatenedifcoalsubsidiesareabolished.
To specifically mitigate social disruptions, it would be more efficient if the
workers currently employed in the subsidized hard coal mining sector were
supported directly, for example in the form of transitional benefits for a
limited time, combined with incentives to quickly switch to a new job.
Payments could also ensure additional training for people with problems on
thelabormarket.Thefundsrequiredforthispurposewouldbeonlyafraction
of the cost of continued coal subsidies.
These considerations have clearly shown that there are no convincing ar-
gumentswhatsoeverforthecontinuationofhardcoalsubsidiesinEuropeand
particularly in Germany. Politicians would be well advised to rapidly abolish
thesesubsidiesandsetacleardeadlineforthisabolition,aswasrecommended
by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2002: 72). As a consequence, it
would become easier to,first,argue for the necessary discontinuation of other
subsidies and tax concessions and, second, reduce public deficits, whose level
has been criticized by the European Commission for several consecutive
years. Ultimately, it would be fundamentally inconsistent if the European
Commission was to punish Germany for exceeding public deficit thresholds,
while simultaneously accepting substantial subsidization of hard coal pro-
duction, which has bleak prospects in whole Europe, but particularly in
Germany.
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